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NOTE
The Constitutionality of the Multistate Tax
Compact
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is now firmly established that states have the constitutional
power to tax multistate businesses on net income reasonably attributable to activity within the taxing state.1 Within this legal framework, limited only by Public Law 86-272,2 the states have fashioned
separate and diverse rules for the taxation of multistate corporations.'
The recently formed Multistate Tax Compact provides an efficient alternative to both the present disarray of state statutes and
possible federal regulation of interstate taxation.4 The principal
purposes of the Compact are to establish uniform rules for determining state tax liabilities of multistate taxpayers, to eliminate ineffective tax administration and the attendant problems of taxpayer
noncompliance, and to eliminate double taxation.
Notwithstanding the success of the Multistate Tax Compact
where it is in effect, its constitutionality currently is being challenged by multistate corporations subject to its administrative procedures. Although the Supreme Court of Washington recently upheld the constitutionality of the Compact's interstate joint audit
provisions in Kinnear v. Hertz Corp.,' the constitutionality of the
1. See Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
For a discussion of decisions subsequently extending the state's power to tax corporate income, see Hartman, State Taxation of Corporate Income From a Multistate Business, 13
VAND. L. REv. 21, 41-43 (1959).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-84 (1970). Public Law 86-272 exempts out-of-state corporations
from state taxation if their only activity within the state is mere "solicitation" of orders for
the sale of tangible personal property that are sent out of the state for approval or rejection
and are filled by shipment from a point outside the state. See Hartman, "Solicitation"and
"Delivery" Under Public Law 86-272: An Uncharted Course, 29 VAND. L. REv. 353 (1976).
3. See Hartman, supra note 1, at 49.
4. See Corrigan, Interstate Corporate Taxation-Recent Revolutions and a Modern
Response, 29 VAND. L. REV. 423 (1976).
5. The stated purposes of the Compact are to: (1) facilitate proper determination of
state and local tax liability of multistate taxpayers, including the equitable apportionment
of tax bases and settlement of apportionment disputes; (2) promote uniformity in significant
components of tax systems; (3) facilitate taxpayer convenience and compliance in the filing
of tax returns and in other phases of tax administration; and (4) avoid duplicative taxation.
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6.

545 P.2d 1186 (Wash. 1976).
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Compact in its entirety is still open to question. Not only may the
Hertz decision be appealed, 7 but litigation pending before a threejudge federal district court in United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission' could result in a United States Supreme
Court ruling on the constitutionality of the entire Compact since the
litigants in United States Steel appear determined to appeal to the
Supreme Court.' The cases are significant both because of their
potential impact on state taxation of multistate businesses and because of the opportunity presented for judicial re-examination of the
constitutionality of interstate compacts generally in light of their
contemporary application. This Note will examine the constitutional law dealing with interstate compacts and then will discuss
whether the Multistate Tax Compact satisfies these constitutional
requirements.
11.

CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS

A.

ConstitutionalFramework

Interstate compacts normally are treated as statutes of the
adopting states, and in cases of conflict, supersede existing state
statutes." These agreements are subject to the compact clause of
the Constitution, article I, section 10, clause three, which provides:
No State shall, without the consent of Congress ... enter into any Agreement
or Compact with another State or with a foreign power ....

The meanings the framers intended the terms "agreement" and
''compact" to have are unclear since there is no mention of these
terms in the records of the constitutional convention.,' The
Federaliststates only that the transfer, in slightly altered form, of
the analogous Article VI of the Articles of Confederation to the
7. Review may be obtained by appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1970). Note also that
review could be obtained by petition of certiorari under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1970).
8. 72 Civ. 3438 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 17, 1972). Arguments were heard before the 3judge court in the Southern District of New York, February 3, 1976. A decision in the case
may be withheld until an appeal is heard in Kinnear v. Hertz Corp., or the time for appeal
expires. Telephone interview with William D. Dexter, General Counsel, Multistate Tax
Comm'n, Mar. 5, 1976.
9. Id.
10. Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823). See also Note, Some Legal and
PracticalProblems of the Interstate Compact,45 YALE L.J. 324, 328-29 & n.27 (1935). Compacts also are treated as "contracts of quasi-international status" the terms of which are
properly to be construed according to contract law. Id. at 328 & n.21.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
12. See Engdahl, Characterization of InterstateArrangements: When is a CompactNot
a Compact?, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 63, 75 (1965).
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compact clause of the Constitution "needs no explanation"' 3 and
that interpretations of these terms are "either so obvious, or so fully
developed, that they may be passed over without remark.""
Two opposing theories of the meaning of "agreement or compact" were advanced at an early date. The first, by Vattel, the most
widely recognized legal theorist during the period immediately preceding the drafting of the Constitution, 15 designated as "treaties"
international arrangements calling for specified acts each time an
occasion specified in the arrangement arises.18 Vattel called these
arrangements "nondispositive" because they do not permanently
dispose of a single dispute or issue, but rather establish an ongoing
agreement to settle future problems. In contrast, Vattel placed "dispositive" arrangements, such as permanent boundary settlements,
within the class "agreement or compact." The second theory was
advanced by Mr. Justice Joseph Story in his Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States.7 His was a more encompassing
interpretation of the compact clause, and theorized that "agreements or compacts" under the compact clause pertain to "private
rights of sovereignty" such as boundary disputes and disputes over
land within the territory of one state.'8 According to Justice Story,
every "agreement or compact" required congressional consent.
Subsequent writers and courts have chosen between these two theories and, as a result, have developed different interpretations of the
terms "agreement or compact. ' 2 Consequently, the meanings of
these terms have become clouded with time.
B.

Judicial Interpretationof the Compact Clause

The compact clause on its face seems to provide that any
''agreement or compact" requires the consent of Congress in order
to be valid. In Holmes v. Jennison,21 the first definitive Supreme
Court interpretation of the compact clause, the Court held that an
extradition agreement between the governor of Vermont and a Ca13.
14.

THE FEDERALIST No.

44, at 193 (Beard ed. 1948) (J. Madison).

Id. at 195.

15. See Engdahl, supra note 12, at 75-84 & n.62.
16. Id. at 76-77. An agreement that calls for support each time an ally is threatened is
such an example.
17. 3 STORY,

COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 1403 (2d ed.

1851).
18.

See Engdahl, supra note 12, at 81-84.

19. See STORY, supra note 17, at § 1403.
20. See Engdahl, supra note 12, at 81-84.
21. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840). See P-H STATE & LOCAL TAXES,
and cases cited therein.

ALL STATES UNIT

6600

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:453

nadian official violated the compact clause because it was entered
into without congressional consent. Chief Justice Taney broadly
construed the terms "treaty," "compact," and "agreement" to include every mutual understanding of the parties-written, verbal,
formal, informal, express, or implied.22 This case, however, concerned an international agreement and therefore arguably left open
the possibility of differing judicial interpretations of "agreements or
compacts" among sister states.
Some state courts subsequently sought to avoid the sweeping
Holmes rule in cases involving interstate agreements,2 and the next
United States Supreme Court case to construe the compact clause
refused to apply to an interstate agreement the broad criteria Justice Taney applied to the international agreement at issue in
Holmes. That decision, Virginia v. Tennessee, 4 is now the leading
case interpreting the compact clause. The issue involved a claim by
Virginia that a prior boundary settlement, approved by the legislatures of both states and subsequently honored by both states for
eighty-five years, was invalid because the original agreement had
not received approval of the United States Congress. Justice Field,
writing for the majority, held that congressional acts subsequent to
the boundary agreement, such as apportionment of congressional
seats and division of federal judicial districts with reference to the
boundary lines established in the agreement, constituted implied
congressional approval of the agreement.25 While the Court based its
decision on this finding of implied congressional approval, it nevertheless addressed the compact clause issue. The Court stated:
Looking at the clause in which the terms "compact" or "agreement" appear,
it is evident that the prohibition is directed to the formation of any combina-

tion tending to the increase of politicalpower in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.2'

One year later, in Wharton v. Wise,2l the Court applied this
22. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 572.
23. One court, for example, held that the arrangements involved were not "agreements
or compacts" within the meaning of the compact clause and thus did not require congressional approval. Fisher v. Steele, 39 La. Ann. 447, 1 So. 882 (1887). Other courts held that
no agreement which deals with matters falling within the police power of the state requires
congressional approval, Union Branch R.R. v. East Tenn. & Ga. R.R., 14 Ga. 327 (1853), and
that no mutual understanding underlay two separate, conveniently complementary state
acts, Dover v. Portsmouth Bridge, 17 N.H. 200 (1845).
24. 148 U.S. 503 (1893).
25. Id. at 525.
26. Id. at 519 (emphasis added). Justice Field cited both Story and Vattel as supporting
this rule. Id. at 519-23.
27. 153 U.S. 155 (1894).
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same interpretation to a similar clause in the Articles of Confederation,2 which governed the dispute in that case. Although the
Maryland-Virginia agreement at issue in Wharton regulated navigation of public waters, the Court found no requirement for congressional consent, apparently holding that the agreement did not interfere with the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.
Importantly, the Court applied the Virginia v. Tennessee interpretation of the compact clause of the Constitution to the question of
what arrangements required congressional consent under the Articles of Confederation. 29 The Court's reliance on this interpretation
in deciding Wharton arguably established the language quoted
above from Virginia v. Tennessee as a rule of law rather than as
dictum.
The most recent Supreme Court decision to construe the compact clause, Bode v. Barrett,3 involved a reciprocal agreement between two states mutually to exempt drivers from the other state
from certain vehicle taxes. The Supreme Court of Illinois, quoting
from Virginia v. Tennessee, rejected plaintiff's contention that the
agreement was invalid under the compact clause for want of congressional consent, and stated that the compact clause does not
prohibit "purely fiscal interstate agreements that facilitate interstate commerce and aid in execution of internal revenue policies. 3 1
The United States Supreme Court affirmed, noting that such reciprocal arrangements between states have never been thought to violate the compact clause.2 A host of state court decisions also have
followed the rule of Virginia v. Tennessee.3 Indeed, according to one
commentator:
... in every case since Virginia v. Tennessee in which an interstate
arrangement has been challenged for lack of congressional consent, it has been
held exempt from the consent requirement . . .
28. Article VI of the Articles of Confederation had provided that 2 or more states
could not enter into any treaty, confederation, or alliance without the consent of Congress.
29. 153 U.S. at 170.
30. 344 U.S. 583 (1953), aff'g 412 Ill. 204, 106 N.E.2d 521 (1952).
31. 412 Ill. at 233, 106 N.E.2d at 536.
32. 344 U.S. at 586.
33. State v. Doe, 149 Conn. 216, 178 A.2d 271 (1962); Duncan v. Smith, 262 S.W.2d
373 (Ky. 1953); Dixie Wholesale Grocery, Inc. v. Martin, 278 Ky. 705, 129 S.W.2d 181, cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 609 (1939); Roberts Tobacco Co. v. Department of Revenue, 322 Mich. 519,
34 N.W.2d 54 (1948); Ham v. Maine-N.H. Interstate Bridge Auth., 92 N.H. 268, 30 A.2d 1
(1943); Landes v. Landes, 1 N.Y.2d 358, 135 N.E.2d 562, 153 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1956); McHenry
County v. Brady, 37 N.D. 59, 163 N.W. 540 (1917); Town of Searsburg v. Town of Woodford,
76 Vt. 370, 57 A. 961 (1904).
34. See Engdahl, supra note 12, at 69.
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Notwithstanding the weight of authority that has embraced the
rule of Virginia v. Tennessee, the decision is subject to criticism as
having misconstrued the constitutional framers' intent. 5 From the
elliptical remarks noted above in the Federalistand the popularity
of Vattel's works during the time the Constitution was being
drafted, it seems plausible to suppose that the framers' understanding of the term "agreement or compact" coincided with the construction placed upon it by Vattel. Since, according to Vattel, the
term "agreement or compact" embraced only interstate, dispositive
arrangements, the compact clause arguably covers only those interstate arrangements that conclusively determine a dispute such as a
boundary dispute between sister states. Indeed, the examples set
forth in the Virginia v. Tennessee opinion" appear to indicate that
the Court itself limited its contemplation of "agreement or compact" to interstate arrangements of a dispositive nature.37 Secondly,
the Court seems to have misinterpreted Story in citing him as authority for its characterization of a compact quoted above. 8 Although Justice Story distinguished between arrangements of a political character (prohibited "treaties") and those of a private character ("agreements or compacts" requiring consent), he contended
that all "agreements or compacts" require congressional consent.3
His failure to dissent from Justice Taney's opinion in Holmes4 further supports this view. The Court in Virginia v. Tennessee, however, seems to have seized upon the "political character" language
that Justice Story used in reference to "treaty" arrangements absolutely prohibited by clause one and grafted it onto an entirely different classification of arrangements in clause three-"agreements or
compacts"-as the test for whether such arrangements require congressional consent. In this way, the Court formulated a rule that
seems directly to contradict Justice Story's construction of the compact clause.
Whatever interpretation is placed upon the compact clause, it
is clear that neither the framers of the Constitution nor the Court
in Virginia v. Tennessee contemplated the nondispositive interstate
35. See, e.g., Dunbar, Interstate Compacts and CongressionalConsent, 36 VA. L. REV.
753 (1950); Engdahl, supra note 12.
36. For example, according to the Court, an agreement between two states to transport
an item to the Chicago world's fair by passing through one state would not require congressional consent.
37. 148 U.S. 503, 518 (1893).
38. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
39. See STORY, supra note 17, at § 1403.
40. See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
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compacts that increasingly have been used by the states in recent
years." Modern "compacts" often are little more than cooperative
arrangements establishing independent commissions or joint agencies to advise the participating states on specified matters or to
regulate matters delegated by the states.4 2 In effect, these cooperative arrangements create suprastate bodies for interstate government that continually perform nondispositive functions for the
party states. Under Vattel's analysis, these cooperative arrangements do not fall within the class of dispositive "agreements or
compacts" and thus do not require congressional consent under the
compact clause.
Moreover, even if the Virginia v. Tennessee rule accurately represents the perception of the framers of the Constitution of why
compacts require congressional consent, clause three of the compact
clause makes clear that Congress, and not the judiciary, is the proper body to determine whether a compact in fact impermissably
encroaches on its area of activity. 3 To say that an arrangement is
an "agreement or compact" only if it tends to encroach upon federal
activity, as the Court has held, in effect begs the question because
it interposes the judiciary between a disputed arrangement and
Congress. For example, if a court determines that a disputed arrangement does not encroach on federal activity, then presumably
the compact need not be submitted for congressional review.
Conversely, if the court determines that a compact interferes with
federal activity, then presumably Congress could not responsibly
approve such a compact. Thus, only if Congress disagreed with a
judicial determination of whether the disputed arrangement encroached upon federal activity would congressional approval be of
any consequence. Further, such disagreement between Congress
and the courts could raise the additional issue of the separation of
powers. Moreover, one commentator has suggested that different
tests have been applied to determine whether a given interstate
compact encroaches upon federal activity; the courts have applied
a test of actual encroachment, while state legislatures and compact
proponents have asked whether the compact may encroach upon
federal activity."
41. For a discussion of one of these compacts in operation, see Goldstein, An Authority
in Action-An Account of the Port of New York Authority and Its Recent Activities, 26 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 715 (1961).
42. For a complete history of the development of the modem interstate compact up to
1925, see Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in Interstate Adjustment, 34 YALE L.J. 685 (1925).
43. Id.
44. See F. ZIMMERMANN & M. WENDELL, THE LAW AND USE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS 90
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This analysis leads to the conclusion that the courts should
defer to a congressional determination in the first instance of
whether an interstate arrangement encroaches upon federal activity. It has been argued, however, that Congress has neither the time
nor the interest to handle the large volume of compacts that might
be submitted for approval, especially if the compacts present no
arguable conflict with a federal interest. This problem could be
alleviated somewhat, however, if consent were inferred from the
failure of Congress to act on an arrangement within a reasonable
period of time after it had been submitted.4 5 Some compact proponents, on the other hand, argue that in the absence of congressional
approval, such an arrangement would constitute a "voidable" compact, meaning one that Congress might later reject.46 Concern over
the voidability of a compact not acted upon by Congress seems
misplaced, however, because no legal impediment prevents Congress from shifting its position on any compact, even after approval.
In this sense, all compacts are voidable.4 7 If the concern over voidability focuses on the inconvenience of establishing a cooperative
organization only to be required later to disassemble that organization because of Congress' delayed disapproval, then a possible solution might be to establish a congressional screening committee for
interstate compacts from which a compact proponent could receive
at least an initial sounding before the compact was placed in effect.
Although the extent of the supervisory power of Congress over
an interstate compact involving both state and traditionally federal
functions never has been judicially determined,48 the existence of
(1961); Engdahl, supra note 12, at 68-69.
45. As early as Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823), and later in Virginia v.
Tennessee, the Court has held that consent may be inferred from a "positive act" by Congress. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 86. This construction of "consent" could be extended to allow
an inference of consent.
46. See, e.g., Washington Attorney General Opinion No. 22 (1968), prepared by Assist-

ant Attorney General Timothy R. Malone, reported in P-H STATE & LOCAL TAXES,

ALL STATES
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47. As discussed previously, notes 10 & 11 supra and accompanying text, compact law
at most has the force of the signatory states' statutes and if Congress were to enact legislation
within its constitutional powers, such state law would necessarily be preempted in accordance
with the supremacy clause.
48. Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 42. The authors note that:
[Tlhe Constitution plainly had two very practical objectives in view in conditioning
agreement by States upon consent of Congress. For only Congress is the appropriate
organ for determining what arrangements between States fall within the prohibited class
of "Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation," and what arrangements come within the permissive class of "Agreement or Compact." But even the permissive agreements may
affect the interests of States other than those parties to the agreement: the national, and
not merely regional, interest may be involved. Therefore, Congress must exercise naUNIT
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such congressional supervisory power clearly has been recognized in
some areas of activity." Congress has taken the position that when
the operation of a compact touches upon the federal realm, Congress
may exert its supervisory power over the entire compact, including
those operations that take place wholly within the traditional sphere
of state activity. 50 Congress can supervise a given compact by conditioning its consent on the provision by the states of periodic reports,
by requiring approval of any changes in compact operation, or by
making periodic investigations." Although recognizing Congress'
preemptive power in the federal domain, states have objected to its
supervision of state matters and consequently, have been increasingly reluctant to submit proposed compacts to Congress for approval. 2 In light of the express dictates of the compact clause, however, the states arguably must obtain a judicial ruling that Congress
may exert control over only the federal facets of compact operation,
insofar as the federal portions reasonably may be separated from the
state portions, if the states wish to avoid overall congressional supervision.
C.

Constitutionalityof the Multistate Tax Compact

Bills seeking congressional approval of the Multistate Tax
Compact have been submitted in previous terms of Congress" and
will be reintroduced during the current term. Congress has not acted
upon any of the bills, however; thus the Compact presently is operating without congressional approval. Presumably Congress has
taken no action because of the continuing political controversy over
whether federal legislation should be enacted to regulate interstate
taxation of multistate businesses.5 4 The question, therefore, is
tional supervision through its power to grant or withhold consent, or to grant it under
appropriate conditions.
Id. at 694-95.
49. See, e.g., Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
902 (1962).
50. See generally Engdahl, supra note 12, at 72-73.
51. See generally Note, CongressionalSupervision of Interstate Compacts, 75 YALE L.J.
1416 (1966).
52. See Engdahl, supra note 12, at 72-73.
53. See S. 3333, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); S. 1883, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R.
6160, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. 1198, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 9873, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 6246, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); S. 1551, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967);
S. 883, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R. 13,682, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R. 9476,90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S. 3892, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
54. See Corrigan, supra note 4, at 426-27, which suggests that part of this congressional
debate may be attributed to the strong lobbying efforts of the Committee on State Taxes of
the Council of State Chambers of Commerce (COST).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:453

whether the Commission may continue to operate under the compact clause absent congressional approval.
The Multistate Tax Compact, which establishes ongoing, nondispositive relationships among the party states, may unquestionably be classified as a cooperative arrangement outside Vattel's class
of dispositive "agreements or compacts" that require congressional
approval. Moreover, this Compact probably is of a nature beyond
the contemplation of both the framers of the Constitution and the
Supreme Court in Virginia v. Tennessee. Thus, the compact clause
arguably does not require congressional consent in order to validate
the Multistate Tax Compact. Nonetheless, strong policy considerations favor affording Congress the opportunity to review this Compact, including Congress' interest in supervising interstate compacts that touch upon federal activity.55
In the area of state taxation of multistate and multinational
business, this interest is especially acute. It arguably may be a
burden on interstate commerce to subject such business to diverse
and conflicting state tax laws, although double taxation has been
dismissed as a constitutional challenge to state tax laws." Further,
some multistate businesses may be taxed by several states on income derived from a single activity, placing them at a competitive
disadvantage with a local business in a particular state. 5 Conversely, a corporate business, by carefully designing its intracorporate structure may escape taxation by any state of a portion of its
income. These problems demonstrate the need for uniformity in
state taxation and emphasize a legitimate federal interest in ensuring this uniformity when it affects areas of federal concern.59
I[.

RECENT APPLICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS TO THE

MULTISTATE TAX COMPACT

A.

Application of ConstitutionalRequirements to Joint Audit
Provisions of the Compact
The Supreme Court of Washington, in Kinnear v. Hertz
Corp.,"o recently considered the application of the rule of Virginia
55.
56.

See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
See Dexter, Taxation of Income from Intangibles of Multistate-Multinational

Corporations,29 VAND. L. REV. 401 (1976).
57. See Hartman, supra note 2, at 387.
58. See Corrigan, supra note 4, at 435-36.
59. See Hartman, supra note 2, at 357-59.
60. 545 P.2d 1186 (Wash. 1976). Defendant Hertz Corp. had refused to provide the
Multistate Tax Comm'n with records necessary for the determination of its sales and use tax
liability in several member states.
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v. Tennessee to the Multistate Tax Compact. The court thus was
faced with the question whether the subject matter of the Compact
tends to increase the political power of the states and thereby encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United
States.' The court was able to sever from the Compact the joint
audit provisions found in article VIII, and unanimously held them
to be constitutional.12 Adhering to the rule developed in Virginia v.
Tennessee, the Hertz court held that the joint audit provisions do
not increase the political power of the signatory states since the
Multistate Tax Commission exercises no greater power than an individual state in conducting an audit.13 Secondly, the court found
that the provisions do not "encroach upon or interfere with the just
supremacy of the United States" 4 since Congress has failed to regulate in the area of audits of interstate business. The court concluded, therefore, that the challenged provisions did not constitute
the type of interstate agreement or compact subject to congressional
approval under the compact clause.
The Hertz court also rejected defendant's arguments based on
the commerce and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Defendant Hertz Corporation alleged that the Multistate Tax Compact violates the commerce clause65 since regulation of interstate
taxation and audits requires a uniform national policy in an area in
which Congress has attempted to regulate. The Hertz court rejected
this contention, however, on two grounds: first-, that in the absence
of legislation, Congress had not preempted the area of interstate
audits;" and secondly, that there was no need for a uniform national
policy with respect to auditing multistate businesses for purposes of
state taxation. Indeed, the court found that because of the diversity of state taxation schemes, a uniform national auditing policy
would be "very undesirable."68 The court concluded that there was
no improper regulation of commerce because the audit provisions
61. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
62. 545 P.2d at 1189; see text accompanying notes 74-75 infra. Article VIII of the Multistate Tax Compact is reprinted in full in the Appendix to this Note.
63. 545 P.2d at 1190. Arguably this is an exercise by the Commission of political power.
See notes 80-81 infra and accompanying text.
64. 545 P.2d at 1190, quoting from Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519. See notes
65-69 infra and accompanying text.
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
66. 545 P.2d at 1190, citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414
U.S. 117, 139 (1973).
67. 545 P.2d at 1190.
68. Id. at 1191.
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"constitute no more of a regulation of commerce than the state taxes
they are designed to enforce."'"
Hertz further contended that the Compact's lack of criminal
penalties for disclosure of audit information, equivalent to those
under state law, results in discrimination between interstate and
intrastate taxpayers in violation of the equal protection clause."o
Rejecting this argument, the court concluded that there was no
unequal treatment of taxpayers because the Compact provides interstate taxpayers with the same rights of confidentiality as exist for
intrastate taxpayers.7 The court also rejected defendant's argument
that discrimination resulted from the Commission's power to appoint auditors "[i]rrespective of the civil service, personnel or other
merit system laws of any party state . ... ', The court observed
that intrastatetaxpayers also are subject to audits by appointed
agents; hence, no discriminatory treatment was present.7 3
Although the Hertz case is significant because it upholds the
audit provisions of the Multistate Tax Compact, its precedential
7
value is diminished by the narrow issue decided by the court.
Rather than decide the crucial issue of whether states may enter
into a multistate tax compact without congressional consent, the
Hertz court was able to avoid this determination by severing the
audit provisions from the Compact itself and thereby limit its ruling
to Article VIII. 75 Thus, conclusive determination of the constitutionality of the entire Multistate Tax Compact must await a subsequent
decision. United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission7
presents an opportunity for such a decision, for it squarely addresses
the issue of the entire Compact's validity absent congressional con69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. The court noted that article VIII, § 6 of the Multistate Tax Compact provides:
Availability of information shall be in accordance with the laws of the states or subdivisions on whose account the commission performs the audit, and only through the appropriate agencies or officers of such states or subdivisions.
The court observed in dictum that this provision "may be broad enough to include even the
state penalty statutes that [Hertz] asserts are lacking." Id.; see Appendix infra.
72. Id. citing Multistate Tax Compact, art. VI, § 1(g); see Appendix infra.
73. The court further rejected defendant Hertz Corporation's due process and fourth
amendment claims. The court found that Hertz Corp. was not denied due process and that
because the Commission is a validly constituted body, its audits do not violate defendant's
fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 1192.
74. The issue before the court was whether the Commission had the power and authority to conduct a sales and use tax audit of Hertz Corp. pursuant to article VIII of the Compact.
Id. at 1188.
75. Id at 1189.
76. 72 Civ. 3438 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 17, 1972).
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sent under the compact clause.77 The following section of this note
discusses the issues that face the United States Steel court and,
ultimately, the United States Supreme Court.
B. Application of ConstitutionalRequirements to the Entire
Compact
(1)

Political Power

The compact clause requires congressional approval of interstate agreements that increase the political power of the states and
thereby encroach upon federal supremacy.7" Arguably, the Commission's power to subpoena any person beyond the borders of a member state requesting such a subpoena79 and its power to apply for
enforcement or compulsory process orders in aid of joint audits reflect an increase in the political power of the signatory states.8 0 The
Commission's subpoena power may be exercised, however, only in
member states in which an audit is being conducted or in which the
subpoenaed person resides. Similarly, the Commission's power to
seek orders for compulsory process or enforcement extends to courts
located either in a member state requesting such an order or in a
member state in which the object of the order is located.8 1 These
powers of the Commission clearly exceed those of any member acting alone. 2 Nevertheless, the powers resulting from the Compact are
not substantial as "political" powers and are no greater than those
resulting from the adoption by several states of a uniform act or
77. Plaintiffs' amended complaint at 8-10, United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax
Comm'n, 72 Civ. 3438 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 1972) characterizes the secondary issues substantially as follows: (1) Does the Compact encroach upon the exclusive federal supremacy in the
area of interstate commerce as provided for in the commerce clause; (2) Does the Compact
unconstitutionally discriminate against multistate businesses engaged in interstate commerce under the commerce clause; (3) Do separate standards in the area of interstate commerce deny the plaintiffs any constitutional rights protected by the commerce clause; (4) Do
Compact standards regarding the qualification of auditors, the confidentiality of audit information, remedies with respect to breach of confidentiality requirements and the scope of the
subpoena powers and their enforcement given the Commission unconstitutionally discriminate against interstate taxpayers as compared to intrastate taxpayers in violation of the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment; and (5) Does the Compact
violate plaintiffs' right to be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures under the
fourth amendment?
Arguably, theie issues were all answered in the negative by the court in Hertz. See notes
60-75 supra and accompanying text.
78. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893). See note 26 supra.
79. Multistate Tax Compact art. VIII(3); see Appendix infra.
80. If the power to subpoena is viewed as a power in aid of enforcement of state taxes,
and taxation is viewed as a political power, this argument has validity.
81. Multistate Tax Compact art. VIII(4); see Appendix infra.
82. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
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reciprocal agreement, which have not been subjected to the constraints of the compact clause. 3 Thus, the Multistate Tax Compact
could be interpreted as merely a cooperative agreement not subject
to congressional approval under the compact clause. Furthermore,
it should be emphasized that the Commission's powers are neither
mandatory nor binding, but are available for the member states to
accept or decline.84 Consequently, the individual states, not the
Commission, ultimately exercise the power that may affect an individual's rights.
(2)

Encroaching upon Interstate Commerce

Even assuming that the Commission's powers tend to increase
the political power of the member states, congressional consent for
the Compact apparently is not required under the rule of Virginia
v. Tennessee unless this increased political power encroaches upon
or interferes with federal supremacy. The question, therefore, is
whether this interstate arrangement for more uniform state tax
administration encroaches upon federal supremacy in the area of
interstate commerce.
The broad power of Congress to regulate commerce among the
states has been recognized since Chief Justice Marshall's interpretation of the commerce clause in Gibbons v. Ogden.8" Should Congress
choose to legislate in the field of state taxation and that legislation
is found to be constitutional, state action that conflicts with such
legislation must yield under the supremacy clause. 7 This has been
demonstrated by the enactment of Public Law 86-27288 and subsequent cases upholding its constitutionality. 9 Thus, any provision of
the Multistate Tax Compact, a form of "state action," that conflicts
83. For example, 44 states have entered into reciprocal agreements for the enforcement
of the respective states' tax laws. See Leflar, Out-Of-State Collection of State and Local
Taxes, 29 VAND. L. REV. 443 (1976). Furthermore, 29 states have adopted the Uniform
Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA). See Corrigan, supra note 4, at 436-37.
84. The Commission does not determine a state's power or jurisdiction to impose a tax
on a multistate taxpayer; it does not determine conclusively the proper division of a multistate taxpayer's income for tax purpbses; and acts only in an advisory capacity to assist in
auditing multistate taxpayers, in educating state tax administrators and in recommending
improvements for fairly characterizing a taxpayer's enterprise structure for tax purposes.
85. See note 26 supra.
86. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
87. U.S. CONST. art. 6, § 2.
88. 13 U.S.C. §§ 381-84 (1970). See Hartman, supra note 2.
89. International Shoe Co. v. Cochreham, 246 La. 244, 164 So. 2d 314, cert. denied, sub.
nom. Mouton v. International Shoe Co., 379 U.S. 902 (1964); State ex rel. CIBA Pharmaceutical Prod. v. State Tax Comm'n, 382 S.W.2d 645 (Mo. 1964); Smith Kline & French Laboratories, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 241 Ore. 50, 403 P.2d 375 (1965).
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with Public Law 86-272 must fail." In the absence of federal legislation, however, the provisions of the Compact may fall within an area
of commerce left to the exclusive control of the states and do not
constitute an unconstitutional regulation of commerce under Supreme Court decisions construing the commerce clause. Indeed,
the Supreme Court has expressly held that state taxation of a multistate business, consistent with constitutional limitations, is not a
regulation of interstate commerce.2
In the absence of federal legislation, the courts have tested
challenged state statutes by balancing competing state and federal
interests. If the subject of commerce affected by the state statute
requires uniform treatment throughout the nation, then the power
of Congress is exclusive. Conversely, in the absence of federal legislation, if the subject affected can best be accomodated by local
regulation, the state may legislate concurrently with Congress. 3
Except for Public Law 86-272 Congress has not enacted legislation
designed to regulate state taxation of interstate business. Thus, the
preemption doctrine does not invalidate the Compact.
The policy considerations favoring federal activity in this area
have been reviewed above." These considerations suggest a need for
uniformity among all the states. On the other hand, as the Hertz
court noted,95 a persuasive argument can be made that the diversity
of state taxation schemes makes a uniform federal policy undesirable, at least with respect to auditing multistate businesses for purposes of state taxation. The resolution of these difficult policy conflicts remains for the courts in United States Steel.
90. See Hartman, supra note 2, at 397.
91. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, consolidated on appeal
with Williams v. Stockham Valves & Fittings, Inc., 358 U.S. 450 (1959). State statutes in the
field of interstate taxation that do not "unduly burden interstate commerce," consistently
have been held constitutional. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 358 (1944). The Supreme Court has sustained a number of diverse and
conflicting state tax apportionment and allocation laws against challenges of impermissible
infringement upon interstate commerce. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 380 U.S. 553 (1965); International Harvester v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416 (1947); Ford Motor
Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 331 (1939); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S.
113 (1920). As recently as 1972, the Court dismissed for failure to raise a substantial federal
question a multistate taxpayer's complaint alleging inconsistent apportionment and allocation of its net income by two states. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 409
U.S. 973, dismissing 27 Utah 2d 119, 493 P.2d 632 (1972).
92. See, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
93. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
94. See notes 55-59 supra and accompanying text.
95. See notes 67-68 supra and accompanying text.
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Fourteenth Amendment Rights

The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the equal
protection clause "imposes no iron rule of equality, prohibiting the
flexibility and variety that are appropriate to reasonable schemes
of state taxation,"9 and that a classification resting upon "some
reasonable difference or policy . . . [results in] no denial of the
equal protection of the law." 9 The Court has further held that a
state may adapt its tax system to different characteristics of corporate taxpayers to provide for administrative convenience in the
collection and verification of taxes of a particular business without
violating either the equal protection or due process clauses. 8 An
important question, therefore, is whether action by the Multistate
Tax Commission, particularly in its joint audits, impermissibly discriminates against multistate corporate taxpayers doing business in
the member states.
A rational basis may be found for the differences in the auditing
provisions applicable to multistate taxpayers and those applicable
to intrastate taxpayers. The problems involved in auditing multistate taxpayers are substantially different from those involved in
intrastate audits." Whereas audits of multistate taxpayers involve
problems of apportionment and allocation of income and application of sales and use taxes to interstate sales, audits of intrastate
taxpayers principally involve expense and revenue determinations.
The different nature of the taxpayers involved also may justify standards for the qualification and selection of multistate auditors differing from those standards as applied to intrastate auditors' 0
Compact provisions granting the Commission interstate subpoena
power' 0 ' and the power to apply for compulsory process and enforcement orders likewise may be sustained on these distinctions. Thus,
one reasonably may conclude that the differing treatment described
above is based on some distinction having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation.0 '
96.
97.
Bugbee,
98.
(1973).
99.
100.
101.
102.

Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 22, 26 (1959).
Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 563, 573 (1910). See also Maxwell v.
250 U.S. 525 (1919).
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts, 410 U.S. 356, rehearingdenied, 411 U.S. 910
See Corrigan, supra note 4, at 430-33.
See notes 72-73 supra and accompanying text.
Multistate Tax Compact art. VIII(3); see Appendix infra.
See F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
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IV.

CONCLUSION

Analytically, good reasons can be presented for sustaining the
constitutionality of the Multistate Tax Compact, at least until Congress enacts preemptive legislation. The Compact and its multistate
audits are within the power of the signatory states and do not encroach upon federal supremacy. Indeed, both the states and the
federal government retain the same powers under the Compact as
they would have without the Compact. On the other hand, perhaps
policy considerations discussed above suggest a need for uniformity
in state taxation of multistate business that the Multistate Tax
Compact has not provided. Indeed because the states have exhibited some reluctance to join the Compact as full members,' 3 the
Compact may not provide a uniform solution in the near future.
Nevertheless, whatever uniformity can be achieved by the Compact
is preferable to the void that has been left by Congress. Thus, the
substance of the policy arguments favoring federal action sublimates in the vacuum of congressional inaction. With policy considerations under the commerce clause at least neutral and preemption
not a factor, a strict analysis under the compact clause becomes the
key to the constitutionality of the Multistate Tax Compact. Since
the powers exercised by the Multistate Tax Commission realistically do not amount to political power that encroaches upon federal
supremacy, the Compact must stand.
ROBERT
103.

P-H

Twenty-one, and soon 22, states are full members in the Multistate Tax Compact.

STATE & LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT

*

M. WHITE*

5150; see Corrigan, supra note 4 at 441, n. 44.

George M. Kryder, Ill updated and revised this Note.
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APPENDIX
MULTISTATE TAX COMPACT
ARTICLE I.

PURPOSES

The purposes of this compact are to: (1) Facilitate proper determination of State and local tax liability of multistate taxpayers,
including the equitable apportionment of tax bases and settlement
of apportionment disputes; (2) Promote uniformity or compatibility
in significant components of tax systems; (3) Facilitate taxpayer
convenience and compliance in the filing of tax returns and in other
phases of tax administration; (4) Avoid duplicative taxation.
ARTICLE

I.

DEFINITIONS

As used in this compact:
1. "State" means a State of the United States, the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any Territory or
Possession of the United States.
2. "Division" means any governmental unit or special district
of a State.
3. "Taxpayer" means any corporation, partnership, firm, association, governmental unit or agency or person acting as a business entity in more than one State.
4. "Income Tax" means a tax imposed on or measured by net
income including any tax imposed on or measured by an amount
arrived at by deducting expenses from gross income, one or more
forms of which expenses are not specifically and directly related to
particular transactions.
5. "Capital stock tax" means a tax measured in any way by
the capital of a corporation considered in its entirety.
6. "Gross receipts tax" means a tax, other than a sales tax,
which is imposed on or measured by the gross volume of business,
in terms of gross receipts or in other terms, and in the determination
of which no deduction is allowed which would constitute the tax an
income tax.
7. "Sales tax" means a tax imposed with respect to the transfer for a consideration of ownership, possession or custody of tangible personal property or the rendering of services measured by the
price of the tangible personal property transferred or services rendered and which is required by State or local law to be separately
stated from the sales price by the seller, or which is customarily
separately stated from the sales price, but does not include a tax
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imposed exclusively on the sale of a specifically identified commodity or articles or class of commodities or articles.
8. "Use tax" means a nonrecurring tax, other than a sales tax,
which (a) is imposed on or with respect to the exercise or enjoyment
of any right or power over tangible personal property incident to the
ownership, possession or custody of that property or the leasing of
that property from another including any consumption, keeping,
retention, or other use of tangible personal property and (b) is complementary to a sales tax.
9. "Tax" means an income tax, capital stock tax, gross receipts tax, sales tax, use tax, and any other tax which has a multistate impact, except that the provisions of Articles III, IV and V of
this compact shall apply only to the taxes specifically designated
therein and the provisions of Article IX of this Compact shall apply
only in respect to determinations pursuant to Article IV.
ARTICLE

III.

ELEMENTS OF INCOME TAx LAWS

Taxpayer option, state and local taxes.-1. Any taxpayer subject to an income tax whose income is subject to apportionment and
allocation for tax purposes pursuant to the laws of a party State or
pursuant to the laws of subdivisions in two or more party States may
elect to apportion and allocate his income in the manner provided
by the laws of such State or by the laws of such States and subdivisions without reference to this compact, or may elect to apportion
and allocate in accordance with Article IV. This election for any tax
year may be made in all party States or subdivisions thereof or in
any one or more of the party States or subdivisions thereof without
reference to the election made in the others. For the purposes of this
paragraph, taxes imposed by subdivisions shall be considered separately from State taxes and the apportionment and allocation also
may be applied to the entire tax base. In no instance wherein Article
IV is employed for all subdivisions of a State may the sum of all
apportionments and allocations to subdivisions within a State be
greater than the apportionment and allocation that would be assignable to that State if the apportionment or allocation were being
made with respect to a State income tax.
Taxpayer option, short form.-2. Each party State or any
subdivision thereof which imposes an income tax shall provide by
law that any taxpayer required to file a return, whose only activities
within the taxing jurisdiction consist of sales and do not include
owning or renting real estate or tangible personal property, and
whose dollar volume of gross sales made during the tax year within
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the State or subdivision, as the case may be, is not in excess of
$100,000 may elect to report and pay any tax due on the basis of a
percentage of such volume and shall adopt rates which shall produce a tax which reasonably approximates the tax otherwise due.
The Multistate Tax Commission, not more than once in five years,
may adjust the $100,000 figure in order to reflect such changes as
may occur in the real value of the dollar, and such adjusted figure,
upon adoption by the Commission, shall replace the $100,000 figure
specifically provided herein. Each party State and subdivision
thereof may make the same election available to taxpayers additional to those specified in this paragraph.
Coverage.-3. Nothing in this Article relates to the reporting
or payment of any tax other than an income tax.
ARTICLE

IV.

DIVISION OF INCOME

Definitions.-1. As used in this Article, unless the context
otherwise requires:
(a) "Business income" means income arising from transactions and activity in the regular course of the taxpayer's trade or
business and includes income from tangible and intangible property
if the acquisition, management, and disposition of the property constitute integral parts of the taxpayer's regular trade or business
operations.
(b) "Commerical domicile" means the principal place from
which the trade or business of the taxpayer is directed or managed.
(c) "Compensation" means wages, salaries, commissions and
any other form of remuneration paid to employees for personal services.
(d) "Financial organization" means any bank, trust company, savings bank, industrial bank, land bank, safe deposit company, private banker, savings and loan association, credit union,
cooperative bank, small loan company, sales finance company, investment company, or any type of insurance company.
(e) "Nonbusiness income" means all income other than business income.
(f) "Public utility" means any business entity (1) which owns
or operates any plant, equipment, property, franchise, or license for
the transmission of communications, transportation of goods or persons, except by pipe line, or the production, transmission, sale,
delivery, or furnishing of electricity, water or steam; and (2) whose
rates of charges for goods or services have been established or ap-
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proved by a Federal, State or local government or governmental
agency.
(g) "Sales" means all gross receipts of the taxpayer not allocated under paragraphs of this Article.
(h) "State" means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, any Territory
or Possession of the United States, and any foreign country or political subdivision thereof.
(i) "This State" means the State in which the relevant tax
return is filed or, in the case of application of this Article to the
apportionment and allocation of income for local tax purposes, the
subdivision or local taxing district in which the relevant tax return
is filed.
2. Any taxpayer having income from business activity which
is taxable both within and without this State, other than activity
as a financial organization or public utility or the rendering of
purely personal services by an individual, shall allocate and apportion his net income as provided in this Article. If a taxpayer has
income from business activity as a public utility but derives the
greater percentage of his income from activities subject to this Article, the taxpayer may elect to allocate and apportion his entire net
income as provided in this Article.
3. For purposes of allocation and apportionment of income
under this Article, a taxpayer is taxable in another State if (1) in
that State he is subject to a net income tax, a franchise tax measured by net income, a franchise tax for the privilege of doing business, or a corporate stock tax, or (2) that State has jurisdiction to
subject the taxpayer to a net income tax regardless of whether, in
fact, the State does or does not.
4. Rents and royalties from real or tangible personal property,
capital gains, interest, dividends or patent or copyright royalties, to
the extent that they constitute nonbusiness income, shall be allocated as provided in paragraphs 5 through 8 of this Article.
5. (a) Net rents and royalties from real property located in
this State are allocable to this State.
(b) Net rents and royalties from tangible personal property
are allocable to this State: (1) if and to the extent that the property
is utilized in this State, or (2) in their entirety if the taxpayer's
commercial domicile is in this State and the taxpayer is not organized under the laws of or taxable in the State in which the property
is utilized.
(c) The extent of utilization of tangible personal property in
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a State is determined by multiplying the rents and royalties by a
fraction, the numerator of which is the number of days of physical
location of the property in the State during the rental or royalty
period in the taxable year and the denominator of which is the
number of days of physical location of the property everywhere during all rental [or] royalty periods in the taxable year. If the physical location of the property during the rental or royalty period is
unknown as unascertainable by the taxpayer, tangible personal
property is utilized in the State in which the property was located
at the time the rental or royalty payer obtained possession.
6. (a) Capital gains and losses from sales of real property
located in this State are allocable to this state.
(b) Capital gains and losses from sales of tangible personal
property are allocable to this State if (1) the property had a situs
in this State at the time of the sale, or (2) the taxpayer's commercial
domicile is in this State and the taxpayer is not taxable in the State
in which the property had a situs.
(c) Capital gains and losses from sales of intangible personal
property are allocable to this state if the taxpayer's commercial
domicile is in this state.
7. Interest and dividends are allocable to this State if the
taxpayer's commercial domicile is in this state.
8. (a) Patent and copyright royalties are allocable to this
State: (1) if and to the extent that the patent or copyright is utilized
by the payer in this State, or (2) if and to the extent that the patent
or copyright is utilized by the payer in a State in which the taxpayer
is not taxable and the taxpayer's commercial domicile is in this
State.
(b) A patent is utilized in a State to the extent that it is
employed in production, fabrication, manufacturing, or other processing in the State or to the extent that a patented product is
produced in the State. If the basis of receipts from patent royalties
does not permit allocation to States or if the accounting procedures
do not reflect States of utilization, the patent is utilized in the State
in which the taxpayer's commercial domicile is located.
(c) A copyright is utilized in a State to the extent that printing or other publication originates in the State. If the basis of receipts from copyright royalties does not permit allocation to States
or if the accounting procedures do not reflect States of utilization,
the copyright is utilized in the State in which the taxpayer's commercial domicile is located.
9. All business income shall be apportioned to this State by
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multiplying the income by a fraction, the numerator of which is the
property factor plus the payroll factor plus the sales factor, and the
denominator of which is three.
10. The property factor is a fraction, the numerator of which
is the average value of the taxpayer's real and tangible personal
property owned or rented and used in this State during the tax
period and the denominator of which is the average value of all the
taxpayer's real and tangible personal property owned or rented and
used during the tax period.
11. Property owned by the taxpayer is valued at its original
cost. Property rented by the taxpayer is valued at eight times the
net annual rental rate. Net annual rental rate is the annual rental
rate paid by the taxpayer less any annual rental rate received by the
taxpayer from subrentals.
12. The average value of property shall be determined by averaging the values at the beginning and ending of the tax period but
the tax administrator may require the averaging of monthly values
during the tax period if reasonably required to reflect properly the
average value of the taxpayer's property.
13. The payroll factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is
the total amount paid in this State during the tax period by the
taxpayer for compensation and the denominator of which is the
total compensation paid everywhere during the tax period.
14. Compensation is paid in this state if:
(a) the individual's service is performed entirely within the
State;
(b) the individual's service is performed both within and
without the State, but the service performed without the State is
incidental to the individual's service within the State; or
(c) some of the service is performed in the State and (1) the
base of operations or, if there is no base of operations, the place from
which the service is directed or controlled is in the State, or (2) the
base of operations or the place from which the service is directed or
controlled is not in any State in which some part of the service is
performed, but the individual's residence is in this state.
15. The sales factor is a fraction, the numerator of which is the
total sales of the taxpayer in this State during the tax period, and
the denominator of which is the total sales of the taxpayer everywhere during the tax period.
16. Sales of tangible personal property are in this State if:
(a) the property is delivered or shipped to a purchaser, other
than the United States Government, within this State regardless of
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the f.o.b. point or other conditions of the sale; or
(b) the property is shipped from an office, store, warehouse,
factory, or other place of storage in this State and (1) the purchaser
is the United States Government or (2) the taxpayer is not taxable
in the state of the purchaser.
17. Sales, other than sales of tangible personal property, are
in this State if:
(a) the income-producing activity is performed in this State;
or
(b) the income-producing activity is performed both in and
outside this State and a greater proportion of the income-producing
activity is performed in this State than in any other State, based
on costs of performance.
18. If the allocation and apportionment provisions of this Article do not fairly represent the extent of the taxpayer's business
activity in this State, the taxpayer may petition for or the tax administrator may require, in respect to all or any part of the taxpayer's business activity, if reasonable:
(a) separate accounting;
(b) the exclusion of any one or more of the factors;
(c) the inclusion of one or more additional factors which will
fairly represent the taxpayer's business activity in this State; or
(d) the employment of any other method to effectuate an equitable allocation and apportionment of the taxpayer's income.
ARTICLE

V.

ELEMENTS OF SALES AND USE TAX LAWS

Tax credit.-1. Each purchaser liable for a use tax on tangible
personal property shall be entitled to full credit for the combined
amount or amounts of legally imposed sales or use taxes paid by him
with respect to the same property to another State and any subdivision thereof. The credit shall be applied first against the amount of
any use tax due the State, and any unused portion of the credit shall
then be applied against the amount of any use tax due a subdivision.
Exemption certificates, vendors may rely.-2. Whenever a
vendor receives and accepts in good faith from a purchaser a resale
or other exemption certificate or other written evidence of exemption authorized by the appropriate State or subdivision taxing authority, the vendor shall be relieved of liability for a sales or use tax
with respect to the transaction.
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VI. THE COMMISSION
Organization and management.-1. (a) The Multistate Tax
Commission is hereby established. It shall be composed of one
"member" from each party State who shall be the head of the State
agency charged with the administration of the types of taxes to
which this compact applies. If there is more than one such agency
the State shall provide by law for the selection of the Commission
member from the heads of the relevant agencies. State law may
provide that a member of the Commission be represented by an
alternate but only if there is on file with the Commission written
notification of the designation and identity of the alternate. The
Attorney General of each party State or his designee, or other counsel if the laws of the party State specifically provide, shall be entitled to attend the meetings of the Commission, but shall not vote.
Such Attorneys General, designees, or other counsel shall receive all
notices of meetings required under paragraph 1(e) of this Article.
(b) Each party State shall provide by law for the selection of
representatives from its subdivisions affected by this compact to
consult with the Commission member from that State.
(c) Each member shall be entitled to one vote. The Commission shall not act unless a majority of the members are present, and
no action shall be binding unless approved by a majority of the total
number of members.
(d) The Commission shall adopt an official seal to be used as
it may provide.
(e) The Commission shall hold an annual meeting and such
other regular meetings as its bylaws may provide and such special
meetings as its Executive Committee may determine. The Commission bylaws shall specify the dates of the annual and any other
regular meetings, and shall provide for the giving of notice of annual, regular and special meetings. Notices of special meetings shall
include the reasons therefor and an agenda of the items to be considered.
(f) The Commission shall elect annually, from among its
members, a Chairman, a Vice Chairman and a Treasurer. The Commission shall appoint an Executive Director who shall serve at its
pleasure, and it shall fix his duties and compensation. The Executive Director shall be Secretary of the Commission. The Commission shall make provision for the bonding of such of its officers and
employees as it may deem appropriate.
(g) Irrespective of the civil service, personnel or other merit
system laws of any party state, the Executive Director shall appoint
ARTICLE
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or discharge such personnel as may be necessary for the performance
of the functions of the Commission and shall fix their duties and
compensation. The Commission bylaws shall provide for personnel
policies and programs.
(h) The Commission may borrow, accept or contract for the
services of personnel from any State, the United States, or any other
governmental entity.
(i) The Commission may accept for any of its purposes and
functions any and all donations and grants of money, equipment,
supplies, materials and services, conditional or otherwise, from any
governmental entity, and may utilize and dispose of the same.
(j) The Commission may establish one or more offices for the
transacting of its business.
(k) The Commission shall adopt bylaws for the conduct of its
business. The Commission shall publish its bylaws in convenient
form, and shall file a copy of the bylaws and any amendments
thereto with the appropriate agency or officer in each of the party
States.
(1) The Commission annually shall make to the Governor and
legislature of each party State a report covering its activities for the
preceding year. Any donation or grant accepted by the Commission
or services borrowed shall be reported in the annual report of the
Commission, and shall include the nature, amount and conditions,
if any, of the donation, gift, grant or services borrowed and the
identity of the donor or lender. The Commission may make additional reports as it may deem desirable.
Committees.-2. (a) To assist in the conduct of its business
when the full Commission is not meeting, the Commission shall
have an Executive Committee of seven members, including the
Chairman, Vice Chairman, Treasurer and four other members
elected annually by the Commission. The Executive Committee,
subject to the provisions of this compact and consistent with the
policies of the Commission, shall function as provided in the bylaws
of the Commission.
(b) The Commission may establish advisory and technical
committees, membership on which may include private persons and
public officials, in furthering any of its activities. Such committees
may consider any matter of concern to the Commission, including
problems of special interest to any party State and problems dealing
with particular types of taxes.
(c) The Commission may establish such additional committees as its bylaws may provide.
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Powers.-3. In addition to powers conferred elsewhere in this
compact, the Commission shall have power to: (a) Study State and
local tax systems and particular types of State and local taxes; (b)
Develop and recommend proposals or an increase in uniformity or
compatibility of State and local tax laws with a view toward encouraging the simplification and improvement of State and local tax law
and administration; (c) Compile and publish information as in its
judgment would assist the party States in implementation of the
compact and taxpayers in complying with State and local tax laws;
(d) Do all things necessary and incidental to the administration of
its functions pursuant to this compact.
4. (a) The Commission shall submit to the Governor or designated officer or officers of each party State a budget of its estimated expenditures for such period as may be required by the laws
of that State for presentation to the legislature thereof.
(b) Each of the Commission's budgets of estimated expenditures shall contain specific recommendations of the amounts to be
appropriated by each of the party States. The total amount of appropriations requested under any such budget shall be apportioned
among the party States as follows: one-tenth in equal shares; and
the remainder in proportion to the amount of revenue collected by
each party State and its subdivisions from income taxes, capital
stock taxes, gross receipts taxes, sales and use taxes. In determining
such amounts, the Commission shall employ such available public
sources of information as, in its judgment, present the most equitable and accurate comparisons among the party States. Each of the
Commission's budgets of estimated expenditures and requests for
appropriations shall indicate the sources used in obtaining information employed in applying the formula contained in this paragraph.
(c) The Commission shall not pledge the credit of any party
State. The Commission may meet any of its obligations in whole or
in part with funds available to it under paragraph (1)(i) of this
Article: provided that the Commission takes specific action setting
aside such funds prior to incurring any obligation to be met in whole
or in part in such manner. Except where the Commission makes use
of funds available to it under paragraph (1)(i), the Commission shall
not incur any obligation prior to the allotment of funds by the party
States adequate to meet the same.
(d) The Commission shall keep accurate accounts of all receipts and disbursements. The receipts and disbursements of the
Commission shall be subject to the audit and accounting procedures
established under its bylaws. All receipts and disbursements of
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funds handled by the Commission shall be audited yearly by a
certified or licensed public accountant and the report of the audit
shall be included in and become part of the annual report of the
Commission.
(e) The accounts of the Commission shall be open at any reasonable time for inspection by duly constituted officers of the party
States and by any persons authorized by the Commission.
(f) Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed to
prevent Commission compliance with laws relating to audit or
inspection of accounts by or on behalf of any government contributing to the support of the Commission.
ARTICLE VII.

UNIFORM REGULATIONS AND FORMS

1. Whenever any two or more party States, or subdivisions of
party States, have uniform or similar provisions of law relating to
an income tax, capital stock tax, gross receipts tax, sales or use tax,
the Commission may adopt uniform regulations for any phase of the
administration of such law, including assertion of jurisdiction to
tax, or prescribing uniform tax forms. The Commission may also act
with respect to the provisions of Article IV of this compact.
2. Prior to the adoption of any regulation, the Commission
shall:
(a) As provided in its bylaws, hold at least one public hearing
on due notice to all affected party States and subdivisions thereof
and to all taxpayers and other persons who have made timely request of the Commission for advance notice of its regulation-making
proceedings.
(b) Afford all affected party States and subdivisions and interested persons an opportunity to submit relevant written data
and views, which shall be considered fully by the Commission.
3. The Commission shall submit any regulations adopted by
it to the appropriate officials of all party States and subdivisions to
which they might apply. Each such State and subdivision shall
consider any such regulation for adoption in accordance with its own
laws and procedures.
ARTICLE VIII.

INTERSTATE AUDITS

1. This article shall be in force only in those party States that
specifically provide therefor by statute.
2. Any party State or subdivision thereof desiring to make or
participate in an audit of any accounts, books, papers, records or
other documents may request the Commission to perform the audit
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on its behalf. In responding to the request, the Commission shall
have access to and may examine, at any reasonable time, such
accounts, books, papers, records, and other documents and any relevant property or stock of merchandise. The Commission may enter
into agreements with party States or their subdivisions for assistance in performance of the audit. The Commission shall make
charges, to be paid by the State or local government or governments
for which it performs the service, for any audits performed by it in
order to reimburse itself for the actual costs incurred in making the
audit.
3. The Commission may require the attendance of any person
within the State where it is conducting an audit or part thereof at
a time and place fixed by it within such State for the purpose of
giving testimony with respect to any account, book, paper, document, other record, property or stock of merchandise being examined in connection with the audit. If the person is not within the
jurisdiction, he may be required to attend for such purpose at any
time and place fixed by the Commission within the State of which
he is a resident: provided that such State has adopted this Article.
4. The Commission may apply to any court having power to
issue compulsory process for orders in aid of its powers and responsibilities pursuant to this Article and any and all such courts shall
have jurisdiction to issue such orders. Failure of any person to obey
any such order shall be punishable as contempt of the issuing court.
If the party or subject matter on account of which the Commission
seeks an order is within the jurisdiction of the court to which application is made, such application may be to a court in the State or
subdivision on behalf of which the audit is being made or a court in
the State in which the object of the order being sought is situated.
The provisions of this paragraph apply only to courts in a State that
has adopted this Article.
5. The Commission may decline to perform any audit requested if it finds that its available personnel or other resources are
insufficient for the purpose or that, in the terms requested, the audit
is impracticable of satisfactory performance. If the Commission, on
the basis of its experience, has reason to believe that an audit of a
particular taxpayer, either at a particular time or on a particular
schedule, would be of interest to a number of party States or their
subdivisions, it may offer to make the audit or audits, the offer to
be contingent on sufficient participation therein as determined by
the Commission.
6. Information obtained by any audit pursuant to this Article
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shall be confidential and available only for tax purposes to party
States, their subdivisions or the United States. Availability of information shall be in accordance with the laws of the States or subdivisions on whose account the Commission performs the audit, and
only through the appropriate agencies or officers of such States or
subdivisions. Nothing in this Article shall be construed to require
any taxpayer to keep records for any period not otherwise required
by law.
7. Other arrangements made or authorized pursuant to law for
cooperative audit by or on behalf of the party States or any of their
subdivisions are not superseded or invalidated by this Article.
8. In no event shall the Commission make any charge against
a taxpayer for an audit.
9. As used in this Article, "tax," in addition to the meaning
ascribed to it in Article II, means any tax or license fee imposed in
whole or in part for revenue purposes.
ARTICLE

IX.

ARBITRATION

1. Whenever the Commission finds a need for settling disputes concerning apportionments and allocations by arbitration, it
may adopt a regulation placing this Article in effect, notwithstanding the provisions of Article VII.
2. The Commission shall select and maintain an Arbitration
Panel composed of officers and employees of State and local governments and private persons who shall be knowledgeable and experienced in matters of tax law and administration.
3. Whenever a taxpayer who has elected to employ Article IV,
or whenever the laws of the party State or subdivision thereof are
substantially identical with the relevant provisions of Article IV, the
taxpayer, by written notice to the Commission and to each party
State or subdivision thereof that would be affected, may secure
arbitration of an apportionment or allocation, if he is dissatisfied
with the final administrative determination of the tax agency of the
State or subdivision with respect thereto on the ground that it would
subject him to double or multiple taxation by two or more party
States or subdivisions thereof. Each party State and subdivision
thereof hereby consents to the arbitration as provided herein, and
agrees to be bound thereby.
4. The Arbitration Board shall be composed of one person
selected by the taxpayer, one by the agency or agencies involved,
and one member of the Commission's Arbitration Panel. If the agencies involved are unable to agree on the person to be selected by
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them, such person shall be selected by lot from the total membership of the Arbitration Panel. The two persons selected for the
Board in the manner provided by the foregoing provisions of this
paragraph shall jointly select the third member of the Board. If they
are unable to agree on the selection, the third member shall be
selected by lot from among the total membership of the Arbitration
Panel. No member of a Board selected by lot shall be qualified to
serve if he is an officer or employee or is otherwise affiliated with
any party to the arbitration proceeding. Residence within the jurisdiction of a party to the arbitration proceeding- shall not constitute
affiliation within the meaning of this paragraph.
5. The Board may sit in any State or subdivision party to the
proceeding, in the State of the taxpayer's incorporation, residence
or domicile, in any State where the taxpayer does business, or in any
place that it finds most appropriate for gaining access to evidence
relevant to the matter before it.
6. The Board shall give due notice of the times and places of
its hearings. The parties shall be entitled to be heard, to present
evidence, and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. The Board
shall act by majority vote.
7. The Board shall have power to administer oaths, take testimony, subpoena and require the attendance of witnesses and the
production of accounts, books, papers, records, and other documents, and issue commissions to take testimony. Subpoenas may be
signed by any member of the Board. In case of failure to obey a
subpoena, and upon application by the Board, any judge of a court
of competent jurisdiction of the State in which the Board is sitting
or in which the person to whom the subpoena is directed may be
found may make an order requiring compliance with the subpoena,
and the court may punish failure to obey the order as a contempt.
The provisions of this paragraph apply only in States that have
adopted this Article.
8. Unless the parties otherwise agree the expenses and other
costs of the arbitration shall be assessed and allocated among the
parties by the Board in such manner as it may determine. The
Commission shall fix a schedule of compensation for members of
Arbitration Boards and of other allowable expenses and costs. No
officer or employee of a State or local government who serves as a
member of a Board shall be entitled to compensation therefor unless
he is required on account of his service to forego the regular compensation attaching to his public employment, but any such Board
member shall be entitled to expenses.
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9. The Board shall determine the disputed apportionment or
allocation and any matters necessary thereto. The determinations
of the Board shall be final for purposes of making the apportionment
or allocation, but for no other purpose.
10. The Board shall file with the Commission and with each
tax agency represented in the proceeding: the determination of the
Board; the Board's written statement of its reasons therefor; the
record of the Board's proceedings; and any other documents required by the arbitration rules of the Commission to be filed.
11. The Commission shall publish the determinations of
Boards together with the statements of the reasons therefor.
12. The Commission shall adopt and publish rules of procedure and practice and shall file a copy of such rules and of any
amendment thereto with the appropriate agency or officer in each
of the party States.
13. Nothing contained herein shall prevent at any time a written compromise of any matter or matters in dispute, if otherwise
lawful, by the parties to the arbitration proceedings.
ARTICLE

X.

ENTRY INTO FORCE AND WITHDRAWAL

1. This compact shall enter into force when enacted into law
by any seven States. Thereafter, this compact shall become effective as to any other State upon its enactment thereof. The Commission shall arrange for notification of all party States whenever there
is a new enactment of the compact.
2. Any party State may withdraw from this compact by enacting a statute repealing the same. No withdrawal shall affect any
liability already incurred by or chargeable to a party State prior to
the time of such withdrawal.
3. No proceeding commenced before an Arbitration Board
prior to the withdrawal of a State and to which the withdrawing
State or any subdivision thereof is a party shall be discontinued or
terminated by the withdrawal, nor shall the Board thereby lose
jurisdiction over any of the parties to the proceeding necessary to
make a binding determination therein.
ARTICLE

XI.

EFFECT ON OTHER LAWS AND JURISDICTION

Nothing in this compact shall be construed to: (a) Affect the
power of any State or subdivision thereof to fix rates of taxation,
except that a party State shall be obligated to implement Article
HI (2) of this compact; (b) Apply to any tax or fixed fee imposed
for the registration of a motor vehicle or any tax on motor fuel,
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other than a sales tax, provided that the definition of "tax" in
Article VIII (9) may apply for the purposes of that Article and the
Commission's powers of study and recommendation pursuant to
Article VI (3) may apply; (c) Withdrawal [sic] or limit the jurisdiction of any State or local court or administrative officer or body with
respect to any person, corporation or other entity or subject matter,
except to the extent that such jurisdiction is expressly conferred by
or pursuant to this compact upon another agency or body; (d) Supersede or limit the jurisdiction of any court of the United States.
ARTICLE XII.

CONSTRUCTION AND SEVERABILITY

This compact shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate the
purposes thereof. The provisions of this compact shall be severable
and if any phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this compact is

declared to be contrary to the constitution of any State or of the
United States or the applicability thereof to any government,
agency, person or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the
remainder of this compact and the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance shall not be affected
thereby. If this compact shall be held contrary to the constitution
of any State participating therein, the compact shall remain in full
force and effect as to the remaining party States and in full force
and effect as to the State affected as to all severable matters.

